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Portland Note: July 2005

The UK’s Presidency of the EU and the Middle East

On July 1 the United Kingdom will assume the presidency of the EU. There are at least two compelling reasons why Her Majesty’s government should resist the temptation to define an ambitious Middle East agenda for its presidency. First, the time-frame of EU presidency -- six months – is far too short for anything of significance to be achieved in a region mired by highly complex issues. The short length of the presidency is also problematic given that the launching of any significant initiative requires that a European-wide consensus about it first be obtained - a very cumbersome process.

Second, under present circumstances, the presidency of the EU is likely to be pre-occupied by the deep crisis which the organization is now experiencing, following the rejection of its proposed constitution by France and the Netherlands. Finally, it seems that other priorities, such as the tailoring and implementation of a different approach to the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Africa, are likely to dominate London’s foreign policy agenda during the coming months.

Yet any effort to relegate the Middle East to a lower priority for the EU is risky. Many of the issues that are inevitably at the top of the EU’s agenda – from the war on terror, through immigration and Turkey’s possible membership, to the price of oil – are directly tied to the Middle East.

But more important, expected and unexpected developments in the Middle East are likely to push themselves to the top of Europe’s agenda. These developments may require Europe’s responses, like it or not. Anticipating these possible developments may allow the tailoring of better informed and more measured responses.

This note attempts to anticipate the “made in the Middle East” issues that may require the EU’s attention during the UK’s six-month presidency. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of such possible surprises. Rather, it will portray Middle East developments that are likely to have significant consequences for regional stability and hence for western interests in the region.

ANALYSIS

Middle East Challenges

During the UK’s six-month presidency of the EU, the Middle East may challenge the organization in different ways. The most important of these challenges are the following: First, the possibility that Israel’s disengagement from Gaza will be considered a failure and will lead to renewed violence. Second, the possibility that continued infiltration along the Syrian-Iraqi border will result in a major U.S.-Syrian military confrontation; third, a possible complete collapse of the nuclear negotiations with Tehran, resulting in the renewal of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities; and finally, a possible setback in the efforts to advance pluralism, democracy, transparency and accountability in the Middle East.

The Israeli-Palestinian Sphere

The first of the challenges facing the Middle East is the possibility that the implementation of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza would end in catastrophe. This could happen in a number of ways: first, if the move will be associated with violent clashes between the settlers opposing the move and Israel’s security forces. Such violence – even if limited to a small minority of extreme elements within the settler community – will likely affect the estimate of Israel’s leaders regarding the costs entailed in continuing the disengagement process beyond the present plan. In turn, if these cost estimates will appear to be high, the Palestinians will despair with regard to any hopes for further Israeli withdrawals.

Second, Israel’s disengagement may be accompanied by chaos on the Palestinian side. This may occur as the Palestinian Authority will fail to prevent opposition groups from firing at the disengaging settlers and at Israeli security personnel in the hope of presenting the withdrawal as taking place “under fire.” Yet even worse pictures of chaos may be associated with a possible “land grab” – as Palestinians compete to take control of the lands vacated by the departing Israeli settlers. In turn, such pictures of chaos will affect Israeli assessments regarding the viability of the Palestinian Authority as a responsible partner to continued but coordinated disengagement, let alone toward a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Both scenarios may lead to a freeze on further progress – thus reducing the Palestinians’ incentives to avoid further violence.

Finally, if Israel’s disengagement will be followed by a decision by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to call for early elections, whatever positive dynamics could be expected to result from the disengagement will be thwarted by the negative effects of the electoral process. To obtain his party’s nomination, Sharon may be compelled to turn right, making various pledges to avoid further concessions. In turn, such pledges will dampen any Palestinian hopes for further progress.

A U.S.-Syrian Confrontation

Conditions along the Syrian-Iraqi border seem to contain the seeds of a major U.S.-Syrian military confrontation. The reasons for this are the following: First, Syria’s authorities have apparently refrained from instructing their security forces to assert control along the border with Iraq so as to prevent insurgents from crossing the border in both directions. That Syria’s forces are capable of establishing a zero-infiltration regime is not in doubt – they have successfully implemented such arrangements along the Syrian-Israeli separation lines in the Golan Heights.

Second, the difficulties entailed in acknowledging the significance of the indigenous opposition in Iraq lead key players in the Bush administration to attribute enormous weight to the involvement of “outsiders.” In turn, this is bound to lead to the expectation that if effective measures were taken to end such infiltration, the fate of the Iraqi project may be decided positively – possibly opening the way for the much sought after “exit strategy.”

Third, understandably, the continued infiltrations across the border are viewed in Washington as threatening the American lives. Thus, it is not surprising that the Bush administration is running out of patience with Bashar Assad’s failure to end these infiltrations. Consequently the administration may become increasingly

attentive to those arguing that the U.S. must take dramatic measures to change Syria’s incentive structure in order to compel it to apply an effective border control regime.

A Collapse of Negotiations with Iran?

Iran has recently agreed to continue the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities until July. Given the recent elections to the presidency, it is not unreasonable to expect that this suspension will continue, pending the post-elections formation of a new government. And, given the surprise victory of Teheran mayor Mahmud Ahmadinejad, it is not unreasonable to expect a further suspension, as the new president – a novice to Iranian national politics – will determine his policy on the nuclear issue.

It is doubtful, however, that these expected suspensions will avert a major confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue for long. First, before and during the presidential elections campaign, Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stated his position to the effect that Iran has a full right to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Thus, Iran’s new president is even less likely than was his main rival, Rafsanjani, to agree to an effective roll-back of Iran’s program by dismantling its uranium conversion and enrichment facilities.

Second, with Ahmadinejad as president, and with Iran’s nuclear negotiations team headed by Hassan Rouhani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s policy on this issue will be navigated by a cohesive group of conservatives. All the more so since Iran’s SNSC serves under the authority of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Third, it is not at all clear what importance will Iran’s new president attribute to improved relations with the west. Specifically, the extent to which Ahmadinejad might regard the improvement of relations with the west as necessary to achieve the economic goals he projected during the elections campaign remains uncertain. Consequently, what weight he might attribute to averting a confrontation with the west over the nuclear issue is equally unknown.

Finally, even if Iran were willing to entertain a roll-back of the sensitive dimensions of its nuclear program in exchange for improved relations with the West, it is not clear how far Washington would be willing to go in improving relations with Iran in order to secure such a roll-back. Given its commitment to the transformation of tyrannical regimes, the Bush administration is unlikely to consider a significant improvement of its relations with Iran, even in exchange for a complete reversal of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And, in the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s elections, the odds that Washington will show greater flexibility over this issue are even dimmer, as doing so would be tantamount to granting legitimacy to a regime that is becoming ever more conservative.

Thus current circumstances seem unconducive to preventing a full-scale confrontation between the United States and its key European, and Iran, over the nuclear issue. More likely than not, such a confrontations may take place during the next few months – that is, during the UK’s presidency of the EU.

Reversals in the March toward Democratization

The next few months may prove a bumpy ride in the efforts to advance the cause of democracy and civil society in the Middle East. In mid-June, these efforts have already experienced significant setbacks. The Palestinian Authority, fearing a Fateh defeat at the polls, decided to postpone the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. A new date for these elections has not yet been set but they are unlikely to take place before early 2006.

During the UK’s presidency, these developments may present the EU with serious demands. As civil rights activists in different quarters of the Middle East may come under renewed pressures, they are likely to seek help from Europe. In no country is this more likely than in Egypt – the largest and populous of the Arab states. There, President Mubarak is likely to make every effort to secure his re-election by continuing to limit his opponents’ capacity to present a credible candidate. But in recent months, the “fear factor” in Egypt seems to have waned. Consequently, the opposition is unlikely to accept the efforts to constrain it without a major struggle and a cry for help from the outside.

Even more explicit cries for help can be expected to emanate from Lebanon. The state of security in the country and the results of the elections held there in recent weeks threaten to reverse the country’s prospects of moving toward greater democratization. First, the perception that Syria’s opponents failed to gain an overwhelming majority in the legislature threatens to reverse the country’s prospects, throwing it back to sectarianism. Second, the post-elections assassination of key anti-Syrian Lebanese figures – notably the prominent journalist, Samir Kassir, and, more recently, George Hawi, the former head of Lebanon’s Communist Party, implies that the country’s will remains subject to Syrian influence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The British Government would do well to prepare itself for the need to deal with the Middle East during its 6-month presidency of the EU. Such contingency planning is essential even if Her Majesty’s government’s other priorities and its estimate of what can be achieved in the region during this short period would point otherwise. This is important because the Middle East is likely to present Europe with serious challenges during the next six months, like it or not.

In the Palestinian-Israeli realm, the EU would need to consider how it might help avert the implementation of Israel’s disengagement plan becoming a catastrophe. More with the Palestinians than with the Israeli side, the EU might exert its influence and stress the need to do everything to avoid chaos at the time of such implementation. In this context it would be particularly important to prevent a chaotic land-grab than might follow the Israeli setters’ departure. Equally, the EU would need to press Israel to demonstrate greater willingness to ease various restrictions on the move of Palestinian goods and personnel, without which existing initiatives to revive the Palestinian economy are bound to fail.

Second, to prevent escalation across the Syrian-Iraqi border resulting in a full-scale U.S.-Syrian military confrontation, the EU under the UK’s presidency may do well to impress upon Syria’s President Assad the need to reverse course and reinstate control over that border. In particular, with itself having troops on the ground in Iraq and given its close relations with Washington, HMG would do well to explain to Damascus the gravity of the situation and the extent to which patience with Syria’s behavior is running out in America’s capitol.

Third, HMG should prepare itself to pivotal nuclear negotiations with Iran during its 6-month presidency of the EU. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to expect that this period may prove critical to the efforts to dissuade Iran from continuing its march toward nuclear weapons. Succeeding in this mission will not be easy. On one hand such success will require that Iran be persuaded that Europe is as determined as the United States to prevent it from possessing nuclear weapons or the capacity to develop such weapons. On the other, it will require that HMG will be able to persuade Washington that more significant carrots – entailing at least a temporary suspension in the commitment to see political transformation in Iran – would need to be offered to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. This task, to be sure, has just become ever more difficult, with Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s election as Iran’s next president. While reaching a “grand bargain” with Iran regarding this project will be very difficult, to date no viable alternative to such an effort has been proposed as a means for reversing Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Finally, HMG would need to consider how much assistance for the democratization efforts in the Middle East it would be willing for the EU to provide under its presidency. This is particularly the case given the fact that the short-term consequences of the democratization process may be messy, including the likely electoral success of parties and individual leaders – notably Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and, in the future, possibly the Islamists in Egypt – who may not be entirely sympathetic to the West.

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