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Portland Note: June 2005Lebanon’s Elections: Out of Syria’s Shadow, Back to Sectarian Strife?Lebanon has successfully completed its first parliamentary elections since the end of Syrian military occupation, becoming the only Arab country so far to make good on widespread talk of democratisation in the region. While Lebanon has a long way to go to achieve truly representative, effective and transparent government, it has taken an encouraging first step. European, American, and United Nations policies can help the country keep moving forward. The elections took place within a Lebanese political space extending along three major axes: one ranging from proto anti-Syrian, one from sectarian to nationalist, and one from corrupt insider to reforming outsider. Parliamentary seats are strictly allocated according to sect and region, with half going to Christian confessions and half to Muslim. Broadly speaking, the elections were a victory for anti- Syrian forces, for sectarianism, and for established families and political insiders. With an anti-Syrian majority winning control of parliament, reform of some Syrian-contrived laws, such as those governing elections, is likely. However, the new legislature, which is composed of volatile alliances, will have trouble eradicating other, deeper-rooted vestiges of Syrian rule, such as infiltration of the security services. Concerns about Lebanon’s shaky economy will preoccupy the coming government, but one of the economy’s worst disabilities, corruption, is likely to go uncorrected, since by and large the government will represent established interests. The elections have left many Christians feeling alienated, and managing rekindled sectarianism will also preoccupy the government. Its will divided between redressing Syrian influences and holding together both the economy and the delicate sectarian balance, the Lebanese government is unlikely to devote real energy to disarming Hizballah, despite international pressure. Saad Hariri, for one, has been publicly sympathetic to the group’s armed resistance activities, and as a political party, Hizballah’s legitimacy within Lebanon is secure. ANALYSISAnti-Syrian Forces Win Narrow MajorityAfter four successive Sundays of voting, Lebanon has completed its final round of parliamentary elections, staggered by region, in which all 128 seats were at stake. The Beirut area, voting first, elected candidates from the anti-Syrian list of Saad Hariri, son of assassinated prime minister Rafiq Hariri, to all 19 of its allotted seats. The next round was also swept, this time by the pro-Syrian list allied with the Shi’ite parties, Hizballah and Amal. Their list claimed all 23 of South Lebanon’s seats. Following these two unsurprising rounds, the mostly Christian Mount Lebanon region sent a jolt through the system by voting in 15 deputies from the list of Michel Aoun, newly returned to Lebanese politics after 15 years in exile. Aoun-backed candidates won a further six seats elsewhere. In the final round, Hariri’s Christian and Muslim allies in North Lebanon swept all 28 seats at stake, giving his anti-Syrian coalition a majority in parliament. In all, Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and their Christian allies now number 72 deputies. Hizballah and Amal together number 29, and Aoun’s bloc 21. Minor parties account for the remaining seats. A Fragile Political BalanceLebanese parliamentary lists are cobbled-together coalitions of parties, sects, or individuals, whose common interests often do not go beyond jointly getting as large a share of government spoils as possible. The coherence of the lists from this election, too, will be put to the test, and the endemic corruption of Lebanese politics will eat away at any programme of reform. Nevertheless, there is a good chance the new parliament will begin dismantling the structure of laws and institutions Syria had imposed on Lebanon over the last 30 years, ushering in a freer, but more uncertain, era in Lebanese politics. The Sunni Muslim Saad Hariri, together with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, had hoped to ride popular outrage over the assassination of Rafiq Hariri to an anti-Syrian supermajority in parliament. With two-thirds of the seats, they would have commanded enough votes to modify the constitution and force the resignation of the Syrian-picked president, Emile Lahoud. Now they will have difficulty wielding even their simple eightseat majority, which is unified only in opposition to Syrian influences. Maronite Christian representation, in particular, is divided between the anti-Syrian bloc and Aoun’s coalition. The pull of sectarianism could draw Christian support away from any programme led by Hariri and Jumblatt, although Christians, who have in recent times formed the core of opposition to Syria, are likely to favour anti-Syrian moves. The Maronite Aoun, who sought refuge in France after starting and losing a war with Syria, counted strongly pro-Syrian candidates among his allies. He has declared he no longer holds anything against Syria, now that its troops are gone from Lebanon, but at the same time reproached his rivals by proclaiming himself the only leader in the elections untainted by the occupation. He had hoped to reprise his 1980s role as a figure with national, non-sectarian appeal, but his bloc of 21 seats will consign him to the parliamentary opposition. He may instead try to position himself as the preeminent leader of Lebanon’s Christians. Feeling misused by Hariri and Jumblatt, many of them are eager for their own sectarian champion. Hizballah Claims Its PlaceAfter the victory of anti-Syrian forces, the election result of most strategic interest is Hizballah’s. Its candidates won 14 seats, and the allied Shi’ite Amal movement holds an additional 15. Their victory is another big upward step for the once-lowly Shi’ites, who constitute Lebanon’s largest confessional group at about 40% of the population. It is also a further step forward in Hizballah’s journey from an armed resistance movement to a mainstream political party, which can now claim to represent about a third of Shi’ite Muslims in Lebanon. Although Hizballah asserts that the popular endorsement of an election victory licenses it to keep its weapons, many Lebanese, including some established Shi’ites, are eager to see it disarm. Lebanese fear Hizballah embroiling them in a war with Israel over a disputed patch of land, the Shab’a Farms, and against the militia’s claims to need its weapons to fight on, they point out there’s little left worth fighting on about. A number of domestic and international resolutions calling on Hizballah to disarm, including most recently UN Security Council Resolution 1559, strengthen their argument. Hizballah’s outside support from an isolated Syria and turbulent Iran is growing more uncertain. Finally, the Shi’ites, who are currently allotted only 27 of 128 parliamentary seats, will remain badly underrepresented if Lebanon’s election law is not changed. Therefore, Hizballah may come to believe that its continued relevance, even existence, depends on further integration into mainstream Lebanese politics and that to move in this direction, it must distance itself from armed resistance. Recent speeches by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah’s leader, hint that the organisation’s thinking tends this way. However, Hizballah will hold on to its weapons and act to sustain its liberationist image for as long as it can get away with. The new Lebanese government under Hariri, who has praised Hizballah as a resistance movement, is unlikely to press it to disarm. RECOMMENDATIONS1) Dealing with Hizballah. On one hand, Hizballah’s political wing legitimately represents a portion of Lebanon’s Shi’ites. On the other hand, its military wing threatens domestic and regional stability, and its ideological programme calls for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hizballah’s political standing needs to be acknowledged in some degree, but full international legitimacy must be withheld until it disarms, in compliance with UNSCR 1559. Acknowledgement should take the form of discreet, low-level contacts with Hizballah political figures. The contacts should probe Hizballah’s willingness to disarm under various scenarios, including incorporation of its militia into the Lebanese army. Open, high-level contacts must be conditional on real progress towards disarmament. In any contact with the group, international insistence on decommissioning of arms should be stressed. International incentives should be aligned to pull Hizballah away from armed resistance and push it toward mainstream politics. Syrian efforts to reengage with the international community could be made conditional on its dropping support for Hizballah. Thus deserted, the organisation might feel it had no future but in mainstream politics. Pressure could then be put on the Lebanese government not to fully embrace the group before it disarmed. As time passes and other issues preoccupy Lebanon, the popularity Hizballah once derived from fighting Israel will fade, and the government will better be able to dictate terms to it. If reform of electoral law opens up Lebanese politics, new parties may form to represent Shi’ites, many of whom are unenthusiastic about both Hizballah and Amal. Such a third party could be granted the international standing denied to Hizballah, which would then be threatened with isolation from its constituents. 2) Protecting Lebanon’s emerging democracy. Lebanon is the closest thing the Arab world has to a functioning democracy, and it can serve as an example. But Lebanon remains a weak and divided country, vulnerable to outside pressure. Bashar al-Assad, gravely diminished by Syria’s forced withdrawal and now by popular repudiation in the Lebanese elections, may try to reassert control over his small neighbor. On June 21st, the second anti-Syrian figure within a month was killed by a bomb planted in his car, and it is possible the two deaths, along with Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in February, represent a Syrian campaign of intimidation. Lebanon should be sheltered from undue Syrian influence and Assad made to understand that interference will not be tolerated. He should be pressed to withdraw remaining Syrian intelligence elements from Lebanon. Vigilance against “creeping re-Syrianisation” needs to be kept up. The more Lebanon’s independence expands and the more its politics repudiate Syria, the shakier will grow the Syrian regime. Governments should plan for the day Assad may fall. Lebanese politics are corrupt, byzantine, and, with the departure of the Syrian overseer, more volatile than ever. Western powers must avoid being seen to take sides or drawn too deeply into Lebanon’s factional politics. Instead, support should be given to independent organisations that promote transparency and to those that foster better relations between Lebanon’s religious communities. Western governments should as far as possible shun any political leader who stirs up sectarian strife, and they should stand ready to mediate crises between sects before violence erupts. They should make a point of meeting with the legitimate political leaders of various communities, even if the leaders are outside of government or the community is small. Finally, provisions should be made to prevent the collapse of Lebanon’s heavily-indebted economy in the event of a financial crisis, and generally aid should be linked to reducing corruption. |
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