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Portland Note: February 2005

From Sharm el-Sheikh to London: Empowering the New Palestinian Leadership

The summit held on February 8th in Sharm el-Sheikh was a first step in changing the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations in a positive direction. The next major milestone - the meeting on Palestinian reform to be held in London on March 1st - should focus on one of the most important prerequisites for progress in the Arab-Israeli sphere: the empowerment of the new Palestinian leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen).

The significance of this task cannot be overstated, as Abbas and his associates share a strategic vision of resolving the conflict with Israel by negotiation, not through terror. This, in turn, results from their judgment that the Palestinians' resort to violence in late 2000 was a catastrophic mistake.

As was also made evident during the Sharm summit, the implementation of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan holds the promise of beginning to end Israel's control of the Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza.

This was underscored on February 20th when the Israeli cabinet gave its final approval for the implementation of the plan, timetabling the evacuation of the Gaza settlements to begin in mid-July 2005.

The challenge of the London meeting, therefore, is to identify ways to empower the new Palestinian leadership, but to do so in a way that will not complicate Sharon's domestic environment and thus render the implementation of his plan impossible.

ANALYSIS

Abu Mazen's Empowerment

The process of Abu Mazen's empowerment is well underway. The first step was his election as President of the Palestinian Authority by 63% of the vote. This was particularly significant given that Abbas made ending "the militarization of the Intifada" the centerpiece of his campaign. Next was the endorsement he received from the Bush administration during U.S. Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice's first visit to Ramallah. Finally, the summit at Sharm el-Sheikh provided Abbas with the requisite regional and international recognition as the Palestinians' new leader.

But the process has just begun. Internally, the next steps are the current efforts to amend the composition of the PA Cabinet in accordance with Abbas' priorities, the municipal elections in April and the July elections to the Palestinian National Council, as well as the planned re-composition of Fatah's Executive Committee. The significance of these is that they afford Abbas an opportunity to reach a new grand bargain with Hamas. The latter will be allowed to participate in the electoral process and, consequently, will gain a share in the Palestinians' governing bodies. This has already begun at the local level with impressive achievements for the Islamist movement. In exchange, Hamas would be expected to comply with the total cease-fire announced by President Abbas at Sharm, committing the Palestinians to a complete end to the violence against Israelis and not merely a cessation of attacks on Israeli targets inside the 1967 lines.

Beyond these important steps, Abbas' empowerment will be affected by two factors: the first will be his ability to demonstrate to his constituents that ending the violence will lead to meaningful economic and practical improvements in their daily lives. The second will be his ability to convince the Palestinian electorate that in ending the violence they will not be merely allowing Israel to rid itself of Gaza while strengthening its hold over the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Showing Significant Improvement

Improving the daily lives of Palestinians in the territories requires that progress be made in two related spheres. The first is ensuring that economic progress benefits the Palestinian population at large. This means encouraging the growth of private sector employment and not just benefitting members of the governing elite. The other is a significant reduction of the most objectionable features of Israel's control: the number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, the presence of the Israeli Defence Forces in Palestinian towns, the number of Israeli checkpoints that Palestinians must cross while traveling their homeland and the magnitude of the disruptions to normal life caused by the construction of Israel's security barrier.

Overcoming Distrust about Strategy

The second essential component of Abbas' empowerment will be his ability to convince the Palestinians that in ending the violence they would not be collaborating with a plan that merely helps Israel to rid itself of the burden entailed in controlling the heavily populated Gaza Strip ("Gaza First and Last"). Even more demanding will be the effort to change the minds of Palestinian skeptics who currently believe that, at best, Israel would freeze the process at its second phase, following the creation of "a Palestinian State with provisional borders." Such a state, many Palestinians suspect, would be tantamount to Sharon's often-stated preference for "a long-term interim agreement" as a way of avoiding any permanent status agreement.

To overcome such distrust about strategy, Abbas would need reliable assurances that the new dynamics created by Israel's disengagement will propel it along the various phases of the Road Map - assuming that the Palestinians also meet the obligations stipulated in the European-U.S. sponsored plan. Providing Abbas with such a promise without further galvanising Israeli position to Sharon's moves will be particularly challenging. This will prove all the more complicated given that Abbas is likely to demand that the two parties soon resume final status negotiations. Such a resumption would, in the view of Israelis, completely undermine the Road Map's logic - that

mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians must be restored before another attempt at a comprehensive solution to their conflict is made.

RECOMMENDATIONS

If the London meeting is to contribute to changing the dynamics of Palestinian-Israeli interaction, it can do so by focusing attention on strengthening the position of the new Palestinian leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas. The challenge lies in finding ways of doing so without disrupting Ariel Sharon's delicate internal balancing act to implement his disengagement plan.

Although some of the issues involved were discussed before, during and immediately after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, these talks did not lead to agreement in all areas. The London meeting could make an important contribution to the process by focusing on a number of realms:

1. Improving the climate for private investment in Gaza and the West Bank. This is critically important if Abbas is to be able to convince Palestinians that his way holds the promise of improving their economic fortunes. An improvement in economic conditions would provide Palestinians with a stake in ensuring the stability of a new, non-violent, status quo. The prerequisite is for the London meeting to emphasise that nothing short of a complete end to hostilities would be acceptable. Any violence would chase away potential investors even if political risk insurance is provided, as it will need to be for private sector flows to be meaningful.
2. Making sure that Palestinian economic gains are widely distributed and that they become meaningful to the population at large, by focusing attention on financial support to the Palestinian small business sector. This requires that the European Union involve itself not only in plans for economic reconstruction but also in monitoring the resulting benefits. Such active involvement would be helpful to Palestinians who are fighting corruption within their ranks, as it would make it possible for them to argue that the international community demands that the new prosperity is widely distributed and that the Palestinian Authority has no choice but to comply.
3. Assuring Palestinians that Israel's disengagement is not tantamount to "Gaza First and Last." This can be done by avoiding any references to the disengagement plan as "The Gaza Plan" and by simultaneously praising the vision and courage of Prime Minister Sharon and acknowledging that Israel's disengagement from an area in the northern part of the West Bank is an integral part of the plan adopted by the Israeli government in June 2004 and approved by the Knesset in October 2004. Thus, the disengagement plan as a whole - however limited its implementation in the West Bank in territorial terms may be - would completely change the dynamics of Israel's possession of these lands since 1967.
4. Assuring the Palestinians that the process would not stop mid-way through the Road Map. Mahmoud Abbas would need to be assured that following the implementation of Israel's disengagement plan the United States and the European Union will remain intensely involved in the process through the various phases of the Road Map, thus making sure that it does not stop half-way. President Abbas would need to be discouraged from demanding an early resumption of final status negotiations. Prime Minister Sharon would need to be assured that Europe will not support any Palestinian attempt to leap-frog to the third phase of the Road Map, which calls for final status negotiations.

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