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Portland Note: May 2005

Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Challenge

Efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring the potential for producing nuclear weapons seem now to have reached a new crisis, with the convening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference in New York. This follows the failure of the talks held in late April in London

between the government of Iran and representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. From the Europeans’ perspective, the purpose of the talks is to persuade Iran to replace the suspension of its preparations to enrich uranium with an agreement to refrain permanently from producing fissile material. Concurrently, achieving a common approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions has now become a central component of the US-European conversation and of the efforts to bridge the trans-Atlantic divide in the aftermath of the Iraq War.

Yet dissuading Iran from continuing its nuclear efforts is not and will not be easy. The right to possess an advanced nuclear infrastructure enjoys wide support in Iran. While this consensus does not necessarily extend to the production and possession of nuclear weapons, it currently seems sufficiently broad to allow the regime to withstand pressures and to reject offers that are seen as failing to meet Iran’s minimum requirements.

Consequently, it is not the case that any agreement between the Bush administration, its key European allies, and the Russian Federation on the sequence of measures to be applied against Iran will suffice. A positive outcome will also require a clearer understanding of Iran’s objectives in pursuing a nuclear option, and a shared assessment as to what might prove achievable in dissuading it from continuing these efforts.

ANALYSIS

Iranian nuclear infrastructure

By contrast to the case of Iraq before the US-led coalition’s invasion, Iran’s construction of facilities that could play a critical role in nuclear weapons production is not in question; it has been acknowledged by Iran’s government and confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, Iran’s track-record of deceiving IAEA inspectors and concealing sensitive facilities has also been widely ascertained.

Until recently, concern about Iran’s nuclear efforts has focused on the 1000 Megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. However, it was clear that the direct proliferation risks associated with this reactor are limited – it is a lightwater reactor and Iran has committed itself to place it under tightened IAEA safeguards.

The discovery in 2002 of a heavy water plant at Arak raised concerns that Iran was creating the capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium by reprocessing the fuel rods used at Bushehr. To address this concern the Russian government has insisted that the reactor will not become operational unless Iran agrees that its spent fuel rods will be returned to Russia and that no reprocessing take place in Iran.

There was also concern that the construction of the power reactor at Bushehr might be used as a training ground for Iranian nuclear engineers. More importantly, it could provide a smoke-screen that allowed Iran to hide illicit nuclear transfers among the large number of legitimate transactions associated with the plant. These concerns seem to have been borne out when Iran’s efforts to hide the construction of a number of sensitive nuclear facilities were discovered. In addition to the heavy water plant, these included two facilities associated with efforts to enrich uranium. The first is a conversion plant at Isfahan, designed to transform natural uranium into hexafluoride gas (UH). The second is a gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Nantaz, big enough to contain a large number of cascades.

These facilities have now been inspected by IAEA personnel, albeit to varying degrees, and their existence is no longer in question. But two important questions regarding the Iranian facilities remain. First, since the Bushehr power plant is to be fuelled by enriched uranium, does the existence of these facilities indicate anything other than an Iranian determination to be independent in the realm of nuclear fuel supply? And second, is it possible that beyond these facilities Iran is developing a parallel secret program dedicated to the production of fissile

material for nuclear warheads?

Iranian intentions

Even more vexing, however, are the questions concerning I r a n ’s nuclear intentions. A number of possible explanations for its behaviour seem plausible: First, considered at various times a rogue and tyrannical member of the ‘axis of evil’, Iran cannot ignore the likelihood that it will be sanctioned or embargoed in the future. To protect itself from this possibility in the nuclear realm, it seeks to become fuel-independent. The second is that Iran is determined, for a variety of strategic and prestige reasons, to develop a military nuclear option, if not actually to deploy a deliverable nuclear force. The third is that Iran seeks to emulate the “Japan model” – that is, to accumulate large stocks of safeguarded nuclear fuel as well as reactor byproducts. This would provide it with the option of withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at some point in the future, leaving it in possession of un-safeguarded fissile material. And finally, that Iran is genuinely interested in a “grand bargain” in the framework of which, in exchange for the right rewards, it would be prepared to abandon its plans permanently to enrich uranium and to reprocess plutonium.

These explanations are not mutually exclusive. First, it may be the case that until the Iraq War, Iran sought to acquire nuclear weapons to balance Saddam Hussein’s assumed efforts to develop and possess non-conventional weapons. And, that in the aftermath of the war and Iraq’s elimination as a serious military threat, Iran might now be prepared to dismantle the infrastructure it has built for the production of fissile materials, if its political and economic demands will be met. Second, Iran may be pursuing two objectives simultaneously: To extract maximum concessions in exchange for its consent to dismantle the declared fissile material production facilities, while continuing to develop a military nuclear option through a parallel secret program. Finally, it may also be that different Iranian governing structures are currently pursuing different and possibly competing interests in the nuclear realm.

The true nature of Iran’s interests in developing a nuclear infrastructure will probably only be revealed in response to the forces arrayed against its efforts. These forces have also undergone considerable change in recent months, particularly since the second inauguration of President Bush in late January. The change reflects much greater convergence between the US, Russian, and European approaches to Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Evolving international responses

The evolution in US policy seems to have occurred at three inter-related levels: First, the first Bush administration (and before that, the two-term Clinton administration) outsourced the diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing the nuclear option to the Europeans whilst criticizing the Europeans for believing naively that Teheran could be persuaded to give up its nuclear ambitions. They also reminded their European counterparts that America’s Iranian agenda is much broader, and that it includes the latter’s involvement in terrorism. They also pointed out that engaging Iran in a dialogue may merely provide it with international legitimacy.

By contrast, the second Bush administration is now engaged in a detailed discussion with its key European allies regarding the negotiations with Iran. While different nuances are still discernable between Washington and some of its European allies regarding the most effective approach to Teheran, Iran now faces a relatively united front for the first time.

Secondly, the US has de-facto adopted the European definition of the problem. Thus, while the US continues to insist that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy is illogical given its vast oil reserves, President Bush seems now to have abandoned the previous total opposition to Iran’s nuclear activities in favour of pressures to end irreversibly its efforts to manufacture plutonium and enriched uranium which could be used for weapons production. Thus, the US has implicitly accepted the European assessment that an outright rejection of Iranian nuclear activity – including the construction of the power reactor at Bushehr – was untenable and rested on questionable technical and international legal grounds.

Thirdly, the US has now accepted that engagement with Iran requires not only the implicit and explicit use of threats, but also the offer of rewards.

Thus, in the immediate aftermath of President Bush’s post-inauguration trip to Europe, the US for the first time raised the possibility that such rewards would include membership of the World Trade Organization.

Such “closing of the ranks” by the US and Europe is supported by a number of more subtle changes on the European side. First, it is reassuring that France – the European country that was most critical of US policy on Iraq – is taking the leading role in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, partly to prove that its approach can be equally effective with far fewer collateral effects. Second, implicitly, by adopting a tough position on Syria’s involvement in Lebanon, France seems to be signalling a willingness to seek a broader common ground with the US regarding the Middle East. Finally, while continuing to pursue the diplomatic option, Europeans seem far more willing than before to concede that if the talks with Teheran fail, there would be no choice but to refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The success of the efforts to dissuade Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state will be determined not only by the skill with which these efforts are conducted but also by the importance that Teheran attaches to its nuclear project. Clearly, if Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons through the use of the fissile material production facilities that it has constructed, it will reject all offers of possible rewards as “insufficient”. This possibility cannot be excluded given the different motivations that may propel Iran to acquire such weapons. Should Iran reject all such overtures, countries that regard its possession of nuclear weapons as “unacceptable” may have no choice but to consider preventive military action.

But before such measures are taken, additional efforts should be made to explore Iran’s willingness to freeze permanently and ultimately “roll-back” its enrichment and reprocessing efforts. In this framework, Iran should be offered two sets of incentives: First, an iron-clad international commitment – that is one provided by the IAEA and backed by a UN Security Council resolution – to supply nuclear fuel to Bushehr as well as to any other low enriched nuclear power reactors that Iran might build in the future. Such a guarantee is the only plausible alternative to the possession of an independent fuel cycle. This guarantee can be provided outside a broader “grand bargain,” in exchange for Iran’s agreement that the reprocessing of the reactor’s spent fuel will take place only outside Iran.

Second, in exchange for Iran’s agreement to dismantle the uranium conversion and enrichment facilities and to allow more intrusive measures to verify the absence of a parallel secret nuclear programme, including the ratification and immediate full implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocols, Iran should be offered more than a set of attractive economic incentives that includes WTO membership. A US-European-Russian joint statement that formally recognises the political significance of these incentives and promises to avoid attempting to change the Iranian political system from outside is what Iran may well ask for.

At the same time, the US and its key European allies should signal their resolve to prevent Iran from producing fissile material by beginning to draft a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran in the event that the diplomatic efforts to dissuade Teheran fail. The existence of such joint preparations – with particular emphasis on constructive European engagement in this work – would serve to persuade Iran that the costs of rejecting the offered “grand bargain” will be considerable.

The Europeans could lend important support to the diplomatic efforts by signalling that if Iran rejects the best “grand bargain” offered and if the Security Council fails to adopt or to implement an effective resolution, they would be prepared to support military action aimed to destroy Iran’s fissile material production facilities. For the threat to be credible, however, it should be emphasized that the military strike would exclude Iran’s legitimate civil nuclear power reactor at Bushehr.

From the US standpoint, the downsides of a proposed “grand bargain” are considerable. First, it ignores other objectionable aspects of Iran’s behavior, primarily its support of terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hizbollah. And second, it requires a willingness to refrain from proactively pursuing political transformation in Iran. While the significance of these concessions should not be underestimated, they rest on a judgment that the implications of Iran producing fissile materials will be negative in the extreme, and that these concessions pale in comparison to the importance of rolling back Iran’s efforts to obtain the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

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